Kilian and Park (IER 50 (2009), 1267-1287) find shocks to oil supply are relatively unimportant to understanding changes in U.S. stock returns. We examine the impact of both U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks on stock returns in light of the unprecedented expansion in U.S. oil production since 2009. Our results underscore the importance of the disaggregation of world oil supply and of the recent extraordinary surge in the U.S. oil production for analysing impact on U.S. stock prices. We also show that stock returns respond very differently at the industrial level to non-U.S. and U.S. oil supply shocks.
Introduction
present a novel method for examining the relationship between stock market behaviour and oil price shocks. Building on the seminal contribution in Kilian (2009) , which demonstrates that demand and supply shocks in the market for oil have different effects on the U.S. economy and the real oil price, they show that the reaction of U.S. real stock returns to an oil price shock depends on the source of the underlying cause of the oil price change. One of the major conclusions in Kilian and Park (2009) is that global oil supply shocks are less important than global aggregate and oil-specific demand shocks in understanding aggregate U.S. stock market behaviour. This inference is accentuated by sector-specific U.S. stock returns varying significantly in response to demand side shocks in the crude oil market and not reacting significantly to shocks to world oil production.
After several decades of steady decline in the U.S. oil production, innovations and new technologies in the extraction of crude oil have resulted in an unprecedented expansion in U.S. oil production in recent years.
1 This development is significant because an increase in U.S. crude oil production directly boosts U.S. domestic income compared with an increase in non-U.S. crude oil production. The recovery of U.S. oil production in recent years is illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows the behaviour of monthly U.S. crude oil production, and for comparison, non-U.S. crude oil production. The contribution of shale oil output to U.S. oil production is indicated by the shaded area in Figure 1 . After U.S. oil output trended upwards to a maximum in November 1970 of 10.044 million barrels per day (not shown), production gradually fell to 8.854 million barrels per day in January 1977, before rising to a local maximum in January 1986 of 9.137 million barrels per day. After January and February 1 Driven by the "Shale Revolution", the Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that by 2015, U.S. oil production has almost doubled compared with the levels observed only five and six years earlier. Kilian (2015) provides a detailed analysis of the shale oil revolution and the implications for U.S. oil prices. Baumeister and Kilian (2015) and Kilian (2015) provide a detailed analysis of the shale oil revolution and the implications for U.S. oil prices.
1986 U.S. oil production successively fell to below 6 million barrels per day in January 1999
and remained below this level until November 2011. U.S. oil output in January 2015 amounted to 9.305 million barrels per day, up from production of 5.497 million barrels per day in January 2011, representing an increase of over 69%.
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Where Kilian and Park (2009) consider the role of world oil supply, we examine the impact of both U.S. and non-U.S. crude oil supply shocks on U.S. real stock returns in light of the exceptional increase in U.S. oil production. While the influence of real oil price on U.S. stock returns is informed by whether global aggregate and oil-specific demand shocks are the driving force of oil price change, U.S. real stock returns might well be influenced by the source of innovation in crude oil production. In this study we revisit Kilian and Park's (2009) major paper to examine the effect of world oil supply shocks on U.S. real stock market returns. Our study is concerned with the questions: Do U.S. oil supply shocks affect U.S. real stock market returns? How do U.S. oil supply shocks affect real stock market returns of major industries?
To assess whether U.S. real stock returns are influenced by the source of innovation in crude oil supply shocks, we build on Kilian and Park's (2009) At the industrial level, we find that stock returns can respond very differently to a shock to U.S. oil production compared with a shock to non-U.S. oil supply. Real stock returns for the U.S. automotive industry are negatively affected by negative U.S. oil supply shocks, while they are relatively unresponsive to non-U.S. supply shocks. Precious metal's real stock returns are much more positively affected by negative U.S. supply shocks than they are by negative non-U.S. supply shocks.
The data and methodology are discussed in Section 2. The empirical results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology
We utilize monthly stock and oil market data and examine the two periods: January 1973 to December 2006, and January 1973 to December 2014. The first period is examined in Kilian and Park (2009) To construct the structural VAR model representation, the reduced-form VAR model is consistently estimated using the least-squares method and is obtained by multiplying both sides of Equation (1) The set-up with two oil supply variables is similar to a set-up used in the 2006 CEPR working paper version of Kilian (2009) , except that the author used OPEC and non-OPEC oil production. The author found that the distinction made little difference for the determination of oil prices. 5 The index is available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html. 6 We follow Kilian and Park (2009) in setting p=24 which allows for a potentially long-delay in effects of structural oil price shocks on the economy and for a sufficient number of lags to remove serial correlation.
price of oil will not affect global economic activity within a given month due to the sluggishness of aggregate economic reaction. The real stock return ordered after oil shocks is motivated by Kilian and Vega (2011) , who argue that oil prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates within a given month.
We assume that non-U.S. oil production does not respond to U.S. oil supply shock within a given month. The U.S. is an oil importing country whose oil production averages 11.5% of the global oil production over January 1973 to December 2014. The alternative assumption, that U.S. oil production does not respond to non-U.S. oil supply shock immediately and that non-U.S. oil production could respond to the disruption of U.S. oil production within the same month, will be examined in robustness analysis.
Empirical Results

Impulse responses of the U.S. real stock returns to different oil supply shocks
In Figure 2 the cumulative impulse responses over a 25-month horizon of U.S. real stock returns to one-standard-deviation structural oil production shocks are shown. Onestandard error bands indicated by dashed lines are computed by conducting recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications proposed by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) . In Figures   2a and 2b results are shown for the five variable model described in Equation (1) However, Figure 2b shows a more distinctive result as a negative U.S. oil supply shock is associated with a negative response in U.S. real stock returns that is statistically significant over most of the horizon. The response of U.S. real stock returns to a negative shock to U.S.
oil supply is markedly different from that to a negative shock to non-U.S. oil supply. In Figure 2b a negative innovation in non-U.S. oil supply is mostly associated with a rise U.S.
real stock returns that are statistically significant in the fourth through eighth months. These results underscore the importance when examining U.S. real stock returns of the disaggregation of world oil production into U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply components following the "Shale Revolution".
The full sets of impulse response functions from Equation (1) These results reinforce Kilian and Park's (2009) findings that the effect on U.S. real stock returns of an oil price shock is contingent on the source of change in the oil market. In particular, the updated sample shows that a positive oil market specific demand shock significantly reduces U.S. real stock returns and that a positive aggregate demand shock significantly increases U.S. real stock returns. It is also seen that the differentiation of supply shocks between those originating in U.S. oil production and non-U.S. oil production, even though they have different effects on U.S. real stock returns, does not change the results concerning demand side influences.
Contributions of different oil supply shocks to U.S. real stock returns
In this subsection we compute the forecast error variance decomposition to address the important question of how much of the variation in U.S. real stock returns is attributed to each structural shock in the crude oil market. Table 1 and Table 2 show the average contributions of each structural shock to the total variation in U.S. real stock returns over 1973:02-2006:12 and over 1973:02-2014 :12 respectively.
In Tables 1 and 2 , it can be seen that by disaggregating world oil supply into U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks, demand and supply shocks are comparable in explaining the variation in U.S. real stock returns. In the period 1973:02-2006:12, supply shocks explain 14.1% of the variation in U.S. real stock returns, while demand shocks explain 16.8% after 60 months. Over 1973:02-2014:12, supply shocks account for 11.9% and demand shocks account for 11.6% of variations of U.S. real stock returns after 60 months. By contrast, using a model in which oil production is consolidated as world oil production, supply shocks forecast 6.4% of the variation in U.S. real stock returns (as reported by Kilian and Park (2009) ).
In Tables 1 and 2 Table 3 . When U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks are not distinguished, the demand and supply shocks in the oil market account for 23.4% of the long-term variation in U.S. real stock returns in 
Industry Results
Kilian and Park (2009) examine whether the effects of the structural oil market shocks differ across industries as a means to establish whether for the U.S. stock market oil shocks are best viewed as aggregate supply shocks or aggregate demand shocks. Lee and Ni (2002) argue that oil price shocks primarily influence activity at industry level through demand side effects. Kilian and Park focus on four industries in the data provided by Kenneth French: the automotive industry, because it may be sensitive to energy prices; the precious metals sector, where high oil prices might be associated with political uncertainty; the petroleum and natural gas industry, because of possible ownership of oil resources; and the retail industry, because of effect of oil price on discretionary income.
The impulse response results for returns in these four sectors to negative shocks in non-U.S. oil production and U.S. oil production are shown in Figure 3 . 8 In Figure 3 a negative shock to U.S. oil supply causes a negative impact on the real return in the automotive industry that is statistically significantly over the 2 nd through 8 th months and 14 th through 22 th months. A shock to non-U.S. oil supply does not significantly impact return in the automotive industry. In the precious metal sector, real stock return is positively affected by a negative shock to both non-U.S. and U.S. oil supply, but the effect of the latter is much more persistent and statistically significant for a much longer time period.
Returns in the petroleum and natural gas industry do not respond significantly to shocks to U.S. oil supply. A negative shock to non-U.S. oil production is associated with positive response over the first seven months returns in the petroleum and natural gas industry, followed by negative response thereafter, with returns being intermittently statistically significant. In the retail sector, negative shocks in non-U.S. oil production and U.S. oil production are associated with positive returns and negative returns, respectively, in the U.S. retail sector. The outcomes for sector stock returns indicate that it matters whether a negative oil supply shock has its origin in disruption to U.S. oil production or in disruption to non-U.S. oil production.
Robustness
To examine the robustness of results we also conduct a rolling sample analysis, which yields similar results to those reported across rolling window width, the forecast horizon, and the ordering of the VAR. We find that the effects of the four structural oil price shocks on the U.S. real stock market returns do not greatly vary from those reported earlier. In particular, changing the order of non-U.S. and U.S. oil production variables in the structural VAR model,
show similar results for the two oil supply side shocks effects on U.S. real stock market returns to those portrayed in Figure 2 and Table 1 . The change in ordering means that U.S. oil production does not respond contemporaneously to a non-U.S. oil supply shock and that non-U.S. oil production could respond to a shock to U.S. oil production within the same month.
Estimating the model over 1973:02-2014:12 with the assumption that U.S. oil production does not respond to non-U.S. oil supply shock, for example, yields the result that a negative innovation in U.S. oil production is associated with a fall in U.S. real stock returns that is statistically significant over most of the 24 month horizon (as before). The results are not reported and are available on request. 
Conclusion
In this paper we show the importance of distinguishing between U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks for understanding the impact of structural shocks in the oil market on U.S. real stock returns. When U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks are distinguished, the demand and supply shocks in the oil market account for 30.8% of the long-term (60 months) variation in U.S. real stock returns (over 1973:01-2006:12) . When U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks are not differentiated, the demand and supply shocks in the oil market account for 23.4% of the long-term variation in U.S. real stock returns.
A positive U.S. oil supply shock has a statistically significant positive impact on U.S.
real stock returns, a result which differs from that in response to a non-U.S. oil supply shock.
In contrast to the results reported in Kilian and Park (2009) , oil demand and supply shocks are of comparable importance in explaining U.S. real stock returns when supply shocks from U.S. and non-U.S. oil production are identified. We highlight the importance of recognizing the source of oil supply shocks by examining responses of industry specific U.S. stock returns.
Negative shocks to U.S. oil supply cause negative impacts on the portfolio returns of automotive and retail sectors and significant positive impact on portfolio returns in the precious metals sector. 9 We also considered subsample periods in estimation of the SVAR model and find that results do not greatly differ from those reported earlier. The negative effect of U.S. oil supply shocks on real stock returns is intensified in the 2010.1-2014.12 sample. We examined the impulse responses and variance decompositions to real stock returns by taking 1, 2, or 3 lags in the structural VAR model when reviewing the 2010.1-2012.14 sample. The results are available on request. Non-US oil production US oil production Notes: Each diagram shows the cumulative impulse response by the U.S. real stock return for the industrial sector indicated in the row to one standard deviation structural shock in the variable in the column derived from the VAR model in equation (1). Point estimates with onestandard error bands constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.
Automobiles and Trucks
Precious metal Oil and gas Table 1 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and shocks to the overall variability of real stock market return. The forecast error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model described in the text. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. Table 2 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and shocks to the overall variability of real stock market return. The forecast error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model described in the text. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. Table 1 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and shocks to the overall variability of real stock market return. The forecast error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model in Kilian and Park (2009) . The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. Table 1 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and shocks to the overall variability of real stock market return. The forecast error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model described in Kilian and Park (2009) . The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. Notes: Each diagram shows the cumulative impulse response by the variable in the row to one standard deviation structural shock in the variable in the column for the four variable VAR model in Kilian and Park (2009) . Point estimates with one-standard error bands constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. Notes: Each diagram shows the cumulative impulse response by the U.S. real stock return for the industrial sector indicated in the row to a one-standard deviation structural shock in the variable in the column derived from the VAR model in equation (1) in which U.S. real stock return is replaced in turn by U.S. sector real stock return. Point estimates with one-standard error bands constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.
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